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1. Introduction 
In November 2007, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) raised interest rates for the sixth 
time since 2004. The former Federal Treasurer Peter Costello said that the latest rise was 
proof of good economic management. He was quoted as saying ‘When you have low 
unemployment there will always be more pressure on inflation ... You would always expect 
interest rates to be higher during a period of low unemployment than a recession’ (ABC, 
2007). This appears to be an appeal to “Phillips curve” logic. However, things have 
significantly changed in the Australian economy since the last outbreak of inflation in the 
1970s which was only tempered by the harsh 1991 recession. 
In this paper we propose that based on these changes to the Australian economy over the last 
15 or so years mean that it is fallacious to assert that low unemployment will always put more 
pressure on inflation. 
In Section 2, we argue that the popular notion of the Phillips curve mechanism that increases 
in unemployment are needed to hold inflation down are no longer relevant for the Australian 
economy. We show that on the one hand the potential labour force is much larger than 
official unemployment suggests, while on the other hand, a significant number of employed 
persons are underemployed, and willing to work more hours if they were available. The 
supply-side potential of the Australian economy in terms of productive capacity is thus 
grossly underutilised despite the “full employment” rhetoric of the outgoing Coalition 
government. 
The implications of these observations are examined more formally in Section 3, where we 
estimate Phillips curve equations and reject the traditional notion that unemployment rates, 
per se, discipline the wage inflation process. Instead, we show that the labour market restraint 
works through short-term unemployment rates and, significantly, via underemployment. The 
reasoning is that short-term unemployment increases sharply in a downturn, which in turn, 
reduces inflation because the inflow into short-term unemployment is comprised of those 
currently employed and active in wage bargaining processes. In a prolonged downturn, 
average duration of unemployment rises and the pressure exerted on the wage setting system 
by short-term unemployment falls. However, as real GDP growth moderates and falls, 
underemployment also increases which implies an alternative for employers to increase 
employment and hence placing further constraint on wage bargaining. 
We further analyse this process by examining the dynamics of employment in Australia. We 
distinguish between a primary and a secondary labour market. The wage setting outcomes are 
mainly determined in the primary labour market, which is dominated by persons in full-time 
employment. Unemployment in this “market” is mainly of a short term nature. 
Underemployment typically occurs in the secondary labour market, where part-time 
employment is more prevalent and jobs often have a casual nature. Wages in this market are 
subject to less formal negotiations. 
Labour market dynamics are represented by the processes of job creation and job destruction, 
and their interaction with full-time and part-time employment by gender is discussed in 
Section 4. In this context, we show that by distinguishing the various labour market flows 
(gender and status of employment) we are able to develop a better understanding of the 
dynamics of short-term unemployment and underemployment better. Moreover, our 
preliminary results are consistent with the schematic representation of wage formation 
described in the last paragraph. Further, our analysis also shows that we should develop a 
better understanding of the interactions between the various labour market flows– in 
particular female job flows. This remains a question for further research. Section 5 provides a 
conclusion. 
2. Is this a Phillips curve world? 
2.1 Trends in real wages and unit labour costs 
A natural anchor for nominal wage increases consists of inflation on the one hand and 
productivity growth on the other. From that perspective we can gauge the extent to which 
wages have lagged behind productivity growth by examining the movement in unit labour 
costs at the aggregate level. These costs are the ratio of average nominal labour costs (sum of 
employee compensation plus payroll tax less employment subsidies as a percentage of total 
hours worked by employees) to average labour productivity (real gross value added divided 
by the number of total hours worked) (ABS, 2006a). Real unit labour costs take into account 
the fact that general price level increases will push nominal labour costs up over time by 
deflating the average labour costs with the GDP deflator (ABS, 2006a). 
ABS (2006a) argue that the real unit labour costs measure ‘provides an indicator that focuses 
more specifically on the direct labour cost pressures associated with the employment of 
labour, which excludes general price impacts.’ The share of wages in GDP is a close 
approximation to this measure. So rises in real labour costs matched by proportional increases 
in labour productivity leave the wage share costs unchanged. 
Figure 1 Wage share of Non-farm GDP, Australia, 1959(3) to 2007(1) 
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Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts, Cat. No. 5206.0, various editions. 
Figure 1 shows the movement in wage share of non-farm GDP since September 1959. The 
share is at its lowest since that time and is continuing to fall. One sees that real wages growth 
has been modest and below annualised productivity growth for most of the Howard years 
(1996 onwards). 
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2.2 The relationship between inflation and unemployment in Australia 
Figure 2 plots the annual inflation rate (on the vertical axis) against the unemployment rate 
(horizontal axis). Readers familiar with the text-book Phillips curve would not be able to 
recognise such a pattern in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Australian Phillips Curve, 1978 to 2007 
 
Source: RBA Bulletin Statistical database. The inflation rate is the annual percentage change in the All Groups 
CPI. 
One might infer therefore that the popular notion of the Phillips curve mechanism that 
increases in unemployment are needed to hold inflation down are no longer relevant for the 
Australian economy. A possible explanation is that the potential labour force is much larger 
than official unemployment suggests and that a rising proportion of the employed are 
underemployed. We demonstrate these points in Section 2.3. 
2.3 Trends in labour underutilisation 
Readers might wonder about the title of the paper “Full employment does not mean low 
unemployment”. In this section, the meaning of that title will become clear. Figure 3 shows 
the employment gap (the difference between the official labour force and total employment 
measured in persons) in Australia since the late 1950s. Up until 1975, Australia enjoyed true 
full employment and the gap was under 2 per cent. Since that time the gap has never been 
close to the “full employment” level and now, despite 16 years of growth, remains at 4.2 per 
cent (September 2007). 
The reduction in official unemployment has prompted various commentators and politicians 
to claim that we are at or approaching full employment. They are unable to be exact because 
they have been influenced by the NAIRU rhetoric which previously had the steady-state 
unemployment rate estimated to be well above 6 per cent. So there is some disbelief and 
uncertainty in their minds when the official rate falls to 4.2 per cent. 
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Figure 3 The persistent employment gap in Australia, in 000s persons 
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Source: ABS Labour Force, Australia, various editions. 
However, the real problem with their analysis is that the official situation captured by Figure 
3, understates the true labour underutilisation for two main reasons:  
1. It considers total employment measured in persons rather than person hours and thus 
ignores underemployment. Recent estimates of underemployment from the ABS indicate 
that it is now a larger problem (in person-numbers) than official unemployment. ABS 
(2006b) estimates that of the 2.9 part-time workers, 576,400 were underemployed 
(preferred to work more hours). On average, these workers wanted 14.4 extra hours of 
work per week. The Centre of Full Employment and Equity CLMI (CofFEE Labour 
Market Indicator) estimates underemployment to be around 2.8 per cent in August 2007. 
2. The employment gap chart treats the labour force as the totality of willing labour in the 
economy which ignores the marginal and discouraged workers who are classified by the 
ABS as Not in the Labour Force. Mitchell (2007) updates estimates of hidden 
unemployment in Australia and concludes that hidden unemployment remains a 
significant problem in Australia despite the long period of economic expansion since the 
early 1990s. 
The CLMI go back to 1978 and allow us to express the employment gap in terms of person 
hours. The left-hand panel of Figure 4 represents this gap in a more accessible manner. The 
official unemployment rate is plotted with two broader measures – CU7 (official 
unemployment plus underemployment) and CU8 (CU7 plus hidden unemployment). In 
Australia, the official unemployment rate in August 2007 was 4.2 per cent. Taking into 
account the estimated hidden unemployment in the same quarter, the adjusted unemployment 
rate (calculated by expressing the sum of hidden unemployment and recorded unemployment 
as a percentage of the potential labour force) would be 5.5 per cent. If we add the latest 
estimates of underemployment to this figure then we would get a labour underutilisation rate 
in August 2007 of around 8.3 per cent. 
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This gives a significantly different picture of the economy which the politicians are claiming 
is at full employment. Ignoring the underemployment, if we wanted to get the official rate of 
unemployment down to 2 per cent then we would have to increase employment by 478 
thousand or 4.6 per cent to allow for the increase in labour force participation that would 
result (Mitchell, 2007). That tells us that we are a long way from achieving full employment 
despite the rhetoric from the politicians. 
Figure 4 CofFEE Labour Market Indicators, August 2007 
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Source: CofFEE CLMI, August 2007. UR is the official unemployment rate, CU7 adds estimated 
underemployment, CU8 adds estimated hidden unemployment to CU7. 
The right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the history of estimated underemployment in 
Australia since 1978. It rose significantly during the 1991 recession as full-time jobs were 
shed in large numbers with part-time employment rising sharply and has fallen slowly since. 
We discuss this development further in Section 4, where we also analyse the evolution of 
short-term unemployment. 
3 The Phillips curve revisited 
To test the notion that the broadening of labour underutilisation in Australia over the last 15 
years has disciplined the inflation process such that a low unemployment rate is no longer 
necessarily inflationary, we explore the role that the underutilisation measures outlined in 
Section 2.3 play in the context of the Phillips curve, where excess labour supply is a key 
variable constraining wage and price changes.  
3.1 Labour underutilisation and the inflation process 
There are several interesting testable hypotheses that link the underutilisation measures to the 
inflation process. First, the standard Phillips curve model predicts a significant negative 
coefficient on the official unemployment rate (a proxy for excess demand) and nominal 
homogeneity (to derive a unique NAIRU). Given homogeneity of labour is assumed, we 
might expect the broader measures of underutilisation to have a stronger negative effect on 
inflation if this model was meaningful. Second, the hysteresis model suggests that state 
dependence is positively related to unemployment duration and at some point the long-term 
unemployed cease to exert any threat to those currently employed. Consequently, they do not 
discipline the wage demands of those in work and do not influence inflation (Ball, 1999). The 
hidden unemployed are even more distant from the wage setting process. So we might expect 
that the short-term unemployment is a better excess demand proxy in the inflation adjustment 
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function. If the long-term unemployed do not place pressure on inflation, then, at best only a 
unique level of short-term unemployment consistent with stable inflation may exist. The 
uniqueness of this level depends on other aspects of the inflationary process, in particular 
whether the estimated models are nominally homogenous and whether hysteresis is present in 
the short-term unemployment rate or not (see Fair, 2000; Mitchell, 2001).  
Third, while the short-term unemployed may be proximate enough to the wage setting 
process to influence price movements, our indicators show that there is another significant 
and even more proximate source of surplus labour available to employees to condition wage 
bargaining – the underemployed. This pool of hours can be clearly redistributed among a 
smaller pool of persons in a relatively costless fashion if employers wish. It is thus reasonable 
to hypothesise that the underemployed pose a viable threat to those in full-time work who 
might be better placed to set the wage norms in the economy. The argument that wage 
determination is dominated by “insiders” (the employed) who set up barriers to isolate 
themselves from the threat of unemployment is echoed in earlier Australian work that found 
‘within-firm’ excess demand variables (like the rate of capacity utilisation or rate of 
overtime) to be more significant in disciplining the wage determination process (see Watts 
and Mitchell, 1990). It is plausible that while the short-term unemployed may still pose a 
more latent threat than the long-term unemployed, the underemployed are also likely to be 
considered an effective surplus labour pool. In that case we might expect downward pressure 
on price inflation to emerge from both sources of excess labour and so reducing the official 
unemployment rate will not trigger inflationary pressures if at the same time 
underemployment has risen. 
This raises an interesting parallel to another aspect of the hysteresis hypothesis. Ball (1999: 
230) argues that ‘hysteresis is reversible: a demand expansion can reduce the NAIRU’ 
because ‘they … [employers] … would rather pay the training costs than leave the jobs 
vacant.’ A similar observation underpins the hysteresis models in Mitchell (1987, 1993). In a 
high pressure economy, firms lower hiring standards and address the skill deficiencies of the 
long-term unemployment by offering on-the-job training. Mitchell and Muysken (2002) 
demonstrate using gross flows data that when employers access both the short-term and long-
term unemployed pools in an expansion yet the long-term unemployed do not exert much 
influence on the inflation process. They argue that the labour market is structured in a way 
that increasing low-skill, low-pay fractional (part-time) jobs are being created which 
overcome the re-employment barriers facing the long-term unemployed. The primary and 
secondary jobs are functionally related. The secondary jobs allow firms to make adjustments 
to demand fluctuations, for example, without disturbing the employment structure of the 
primary labour market. Thus when employment growth is strong enough both pools of 
unemployed find employment opportunities. So while the long-term unemployed do have 
employment opportunities in an expansion they are in jobs that do not set the wage norms. 
However, once they become re-attached to the employed labour force, they may influence 
wage setting via underemployment, given that they will often only have part-time jobs 
available to them. As part-timers with some in-house training they become an entirely 
different proposition than when they were facing skill atrophy and motivation loss after more 
than 12 months without work. 
This discussion leads to two major hypotheses: 
1. The short-term unemployment rate (STUR) constrains the annual inflation rate more than 
the overall unemployment rate (UR). By implication we expect the long-term 
unemployment rate (LTUR) to be a statistically insignificant influence on the annual 
inflation rate. 
2. The degree of underemployment (UE) exerts a separate negative impact on the inflation 
process. 
We test these hypotheses below. 
3.2 Phillips curve estimation 
Following Mitchell (2001), we use a general autoregressive-distributed lag Phillips curve 
representation like: 
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tpwhere is the annual rate of inflation, u is the unemployment rate, z is a cost shock variables 
(like import price inflation, capital costs), and the ε is a white-noise error term. 
The parameterisations of the excess demand variable that we consider are all assumed to be 
I(0) variables given they are bounded and are: 
(a) The official unemployment rate (UR). In each case (following Gruen et al, 1999) we tried 
four-quarter moving average representations of the underutilisation variable to match it 
with the annualised change in the dependent variable. The high persistence in the 
underutilisation series means the results are very similar and are not reported; 
(b) The short-term unemployment rate (STUR) defined by ABS as those unemployment for 
less 52 weeks as a percentage of the total labour force; 
(c) The rate of the underemployment (UE) computed from the CLMI as explained above; 
and 
(d) The difference between the short-term unemployment rate and its filtered trend derived 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (STUR Gap). This construct is now commonly used and 
has been referred to in papers by the OECD and others as a test of the Time Varying 
NAIRU hypothesis (Boone, 2000; see also Mitchell, 2001 for more detail). We examine 
the validity of this inference below. 
Within a similar framework to Equation (1), Mitchell (2001) find evidence that the estimated 
Phillips curve does not exhibit dynamics consistent with a constant NAIRU (see Fair, 2000 
for details of the simple homogeneity test based on the lagged inflation term(s)). The same 
test (results available on request) allows us to easily reject the constant NAIRU hypothesis in 
all the equations reported in Table 1. 
We initially develop a Phillips curve model for Australia using 4 lags on the annualised 
inflation terms (Δ4CPI) and import prices (Δ4PM), the level of the unemployment rate, a 
dummy variable (defined as 1 in 2000:3 and zero otherwise) to take into account the 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax system in Australia in July 2000. We also test 
other influences that have been mentioned in the literature, by including variables to capture 
the cost of capital, interest spread, and payroll taxes and the like (Phelps, 1994, Modigliani, 
2000). The other variables were not significant in the final tested-down specification. 
Standard unit root tests (ADF) confirm that the inflation and import price inflation series are 
I(1) and that they co-integrate, meaning that we can use them in a regression with stationary 
variables like the underutilisation measures. Our analysis largely ignores any broader 
interaction in terms of the implied error correction dynamics. The statistical validity of the 
exercise is to be judged by the diagnostic performance of the models. Sequential testing down 
from the general equation using different measures of the underutilisation variable yielded the 
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results shown in Table 1. In each case, the dynamics were so close and the coefficient 
estimates for the other variables were highly stable that a common specification is employed 
to aid comparison. In general, the diagnostics of all equations were satisfactory apart from 
some evidence of fourth-order serial correlation, which could reflect the four-quarter change 
specification. The estimates are based on regressions with an AR(4) correction applied, 
although they are not much different to the uncorrected estimates. 
Table 1 Phillips curve regressions, Australia, 1982:3 to 2007:1 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 
C 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 
 (2.81) (4.08) (3.13) (4.07) (2.22) (3.39) 
Δ4CPI(-1) 0.88 0.56 0.90 0.57 0.89 0.76 
 (21.6) (6.03) (25.7) (6.17) (32.8) (14.1) 
UR -0.001 0.000     
 (2.13) (0.12)     
STUR   -0.002 0.000   
   (2.64) (0.33)   
STUR GAP     -0.007 -0.006 
     (5.28) (4.11) 
UE  -0.010  -0.010  -0.005 
  (3.27)  (3.33)  (3.09) 
Δ4PM 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 (4.13) (4.97) (4.22) (4.99) (3.79) (3.87) 
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 
S.E. % of mean Δ4P 15.0 14.1 14.9 14.1 14.1 13.6 
SC(1) Prob value 0.40 0.95 0.30 0.94 0.26 0.56 
SC(2) Prob value 0.59 0.47 0.57 0.48 0.51 0.79 
SC(4) Prob value 0.17 0.51 0.17 0.49 0.09 0.12 
ARCH(5) Prob value 0.44 0.68 0.46 0.64 0.58 0.64 
RESET(1) Prob value 0.96 0.34 0.83 0.36 0.29 0.19 
Notes: SC(n) is the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM(n) test, ARCH is a 5th order test for Autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity, RESET is the Ramsey RESET test with 1 added terms. SE% is the standard error 
as a percentage of the mean of the dependent variable and t-statistics are in parentheses. GST dummy variable is 
not shown but was highly significant and positive in all regressions as expected. 
Equation 1.1 describes a typical Phillips curve using the aggregate unemployment rate (UR). 
The unemployment rate exerts a negative influence on the rate of inflation (-0.001). The 
added effect of the underemployment variable (UE) is depicted in Equation 1.2. It is 
statistically significant which indicates that it exerts negative influence on annual inflation. 
Significantly, the UR is no longer statistically significant. In Equation 1.3, the degree of 
negative pressure on inflation exerted by the highly significant STUR is -0.002, twice the 
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impact of the UR estimated in Equation 1.1. When UE is added it is statistically significant 
and the STUR is no longer statistically significant (Equation 1.4). 
Equations 1.5 to 1.6 utilise the gap specification for the excess demand variable. Mitchell 
(2002) argues that the NAIRU concept remains on shaky theoretical grounds. The original 
theory underpinning the NAIRU provides no guidance about its evolution although, 
unspecified structural factors should be involved to remain faithful to that theory. In this 
theoretical void, econometricians use techniques that allow for a smooth evolution although 
there is no particular correspondence with any actual economic factors. Some authors assert 
that a Hodrick-Prescott filter through the actual series captures the TV-NAIRU (for example 
Boone, 2000 among many). Of course, the Hodrick-Prescott filter merely tracks the 
underlying trend of the unemployment and follows it down just as surely as it follows it up. 
The unemployment rate is highly cyclical and the TV-NAIRU proponents are silent on this 
apparent anomaly – why do the alleged structural factors cycle with the actual rate? 
Equations 1.5 to 1.6 compare STUR Gap with and without the UE variable. The results 
suggest that: (a) underemployment plays a significant constraining influence on inflation 
independent of the unemployment; (b) STUR Gap remains significant and generates an 
inflation discipline that is commensurate with that imposed by underemployment. 
The significant values of the coefficients on the STUR Gap and UE variables suggest the 
following dynamics are plausible. A downturn increases short-term unemployment sharply, 
which reduces inflation because the inflow into short-term unemployment is comprised of 
those currently employed and active in wage bargaining processes. In a prolonged downturn, 
average duration of unemployment rises and the pressure exerted on the wage setting system 
by unemployment overall falls. This requires higher levels of short-term unemployment being 
created to reach low inflation targets with the consequence of increasing proportions of long-
term unemployment being created. In addition, as real GDP growth moderates and falls, 
underemployment also increases placing further constraint on price inflation. The results 
taken together provide some support for the hypotheses (1) to (2) outlined above. 
4 Job creation and job destruction and the dynamics on the labour market 
4.1 Employment trends in Australia 
Having discussed the general trends in labour underutilisation in Section 2.3, we now turn to 
a closer analysis of employment trends. Table 2 shows that employment growth has 
accelerated in the last two years. Between 1995 and 2000, male employment expanded by an 
average of 70 thousand odd jobs per annum compared to 90 thousand for females. This 
average has more than doubled for males in the last 12 months while female employment 
growth has fallen in the last 12 months. Over the 12 year period, a total of 2.3 million jobs 
have been added (in net terms) to the Australian economy and 51.8 per cent of them have 
gone to females. 
To better understand the changes, Table 2 provides a summary of some key employment 
trends between September 1995 and September 2007. Over the entire period, part-time 
employment growth accounted for 41.3 per cent of total net jobs created. However, up until 
2005 this percentage was in the high 40s. This proportion has fallen steadily but plunged in 
2006. In the 12 months to September 2007, it was 32 per cent. Full-time employment growth 
has dominated in recent years. The gender differences are remarkable and bear on why 
females have been losing out in the recent growth phase. For males, 31 per cent of net jobs 
generated over 1995-2007 were part time but this proportion fell to 11.8 per cent in the 12 
months to September 2007.  
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For females, the opposite is true and despite a plunge in ratio in 2005-06 (September-
September – 17.4 per cent), the proportion soared to 62.5 per cent in the 12 months to 
September 2007. So over the last two years, males have captured a disproportionate per cent 
of the net full-time jobs growth whereas females have captured a disproportionate per cent of 
the net part-time jobs growth. 
Table 2 Employment trends in Australia, 1996-2007 
  Full time Part time PT/Total ΔFT ΔPT ΔTotal ΔPT/ΔTotal 
  000’s 000’s % 000’s 000’s 000’s % 
Males        
Sep-95 4,210.2 522.8 11.0     
Sep-00 4,415.1 668.7 13.2 204.9 145.9 350.7 41.6 
Sep-05 4,745.4 806.6 14.5 330.3 137.9 468.3 29.4 
Sep-06 4,829.8 841.0 14.8 84.4 34.4 118.8 29.0 
Sep-07 4,966.8 859.4 14.8 137.0 18.4 155.4 11.8 
1995-2007   756.6 336.6 1,093.2 30.8 
Females        
Sep-95 2,074.4 1,535.3 42.5     
Sep-00 2,288.3 1,773.9 43.7 213.9 238.6 452.5 52.7 
Sep-05 2,496.9 2,047.1 45.0 208.6 273.2 481.9 56.7 
Sep-06 2,611.7 2,071.3 44.2 114.8 24.2 139.0 17.4 
Sep-07 2,650.2 2,135.3 44.6 38.5 64.0 102.4 62.5 
1995-2007   575.8 600.0 1,175.8 51.0 
Persons        
Sep-95 6,284.6 2,058.1 24.7     
Sep-00 6,703.4 2,442.6 26.7 418.8 384.5 803.2 47.9 
Sep-05 7,242.3 2,853.7 28.3 538.9 411.1 950.2 43.3 
Sep-06 7,441.5 2,912.3 28.1 199.2 58.6 257.8 22.7 
Sep-07 7,617.0 2,994.7 28.2 175.5 82.4 257.8 32.0 
1995-2007   1,332.4 936.6 2,269.0 41.3 
Source: ABS Labour Force, Australia. Δ = change (000s). PT is part-time, FT is full-time. 
It is likely that in the face of less available stocks of workers looking for work, firms are 
restructuring and offering more full-time employment. The corollary is, of-course, as Arthur 
Okun observed long ago, that unemployment was the tip of the iceberg and as the business 
cycle became stronger, several labour market adjustments occurred including longer working 
hours. The increase in full-time jobs relative to part-time is consistent with this observation 
and reinforces the point we make in the next section about underemployment. The growth in 
underemployed part-timers has to be seen as one cost of running the economy at low pressure 
for too long. In Mitchell and Muysken (2008) we lay the blame for this state at the feet of the 
Federal Government who have refused to pursue a full employment policy and as a result 
allowed the economy to languish at low pressure with all the attendant macroeconomic 
inefficiency cumulating losses every day. 
4.2 Job creation and destruction and employment growth 
By examining the process of job creation and destruction we can gain new insights into the 
movements of workers between labour force states. Analysis of employment dynamics using 
macroeconomic data typically focuses on measures of net employment changes over time, as 
we did in the previous section. However, this aggregate focus prevents an understanding of 
flows noted above (numbers of jobs created and destroyed and movements of workers across 
labour force categories). This section builds on previous work by Mitchell et al (2005) and 
Mitchell and Myers (2007). 
The analysis in this section is based on the widely used job creation rate and job destruction 
rate measures introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992). Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1992: 827-8) calculate “gross job creation by summing the employment gains at expanding 
and new establishments within a sector. Similarly, we calculate gross job destruction by 
summing employment losses at shrinking and dying establishments within a sector.” These 
job flows are converted to rates by dividing by sector size (see Mitchell et al., 2005 for more 
detail). 
Figure 5 Job creation (JCR) and job destruction (JDR) rates, All Industries, Australia, 1985-
2007 
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Source: ABS Labour Force, Australia, industry employment tables. 
Figure 5 shows the aggregate job creation and job destruction rates in Australia since 1985. 
Two striking features are: (a) both series show clear cyclical fluctuations. The impact of the 
1991 recession is striking (plunging job creation and soaring job destruction rates). Over the 
ensuing boom, job creation increases while job destruction decreases; and (b) both rates are 
relatively constant over the cycle: the job creation rate fluctuates around 2.1 per cent, whereas 
the job destruction rate fluctuates around 1.5 per cent. 
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Figure 6 shows that diverging patterns of job creation and destruction developments by 
gender and fraction of employment underlie the relatively constant aggregate rates. When we 
distinguish the full-time and part-time rates of job creation and job destruction by gender for 
various periods, several features are worth noting. 
Figure 6 Male and female JCRs and JDRs, full-time and part-time, Australia, 1985-2007 
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(b) Female – full-time flows 
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(c) Male – part-time flows 
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(d) Female – part-time flows 
First, from 2000 to 2007, the average rate of job creation for males was 2.6 and 6.2 per cent 
for full-time and part-time respectively, while the average rate of job destruction was 2.2 and 
5.2 per cent. For females, the average rate of job creation was 3.4 and 3.7 per cent for full-
time and part-time respectively, while the average rate of job destruction was 2.7 and 3.0 per 
cent. Thus, the average rates of job creation and job destruction for part-time were much 
greater than full-time rates. However, in absolute terms there were many more full-time jobs 
created and destroyed, than part-time jobs. 
Second, the rates of job creation and job destruction behave differently during upswings and 
downswings over the cycle. This holds for both full-time and part-time job dynamics. During 
the 1991 recession (1990:3 to 1991:3), it is noticeable that while full-time job creation rates 
fell sharply, part-time job creation rates were less susceptible. Male job destruction rates rose 
sharply during this period in contradistinction to part-time rates fell. This confirms the results 
from Mitchell et al. (2005) who showed that the 1991 recession was a major turning point in 
the use of part-time work to replace full-time employment, particularly for males. Female job 
flows were less sensitive to the recession. 
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In the ensuing recovery (1991:4 to 2000:1), job creation rates slowly increased for both male 
and female full-time work but fell for part-time work as the economy added extra hours of 
activity in response to improving demand conditions. Job destruction rates also fell across the 
board, with the exception of female full-time rates which rose. 
Third, part-time rates have been decreasing over time, while full-time rates increased slowly.  
In the 2000 to 2005 period, the evidence is that the recovery gathered pace and full-time job 
creation rates rose for both males and females (to around the average rates for the whole 
period). Over the same period, part-time rates for both males and females fell indicating the 
shift towards more full-time employment creation. The volatility in the labour market also 
increased with full-time job destruction rates increasing for both males and females. 
In the last two years (2005 to 2007), full-time job creation rates are now the highest for the 
period since 1984 for both males (2.8 per cent) and females (3.5 per cent) whereas part-time 
rates remained steady over the whole period from 2000. The interesting point is that part-time 
job creation rates for males are still well above the full-time job creation rates whereas for 
females, full-time rates are nearly on par with part-time job creation rates. 
These latest developments seem to modify the earlier observations that recessions have been 
used to replace full-time jobs by part-time jobs. However, we observe from Table 2 that the 
share of part-time employment has by now stabilised at an all-time high: 15 per cent for men 
and 45 per cent for women. As we have seen in Figure 3 this leaves room for considerable 
underemployment: currently at around 3 per cent of the labour force. 
4.3 Intermezzo: Is there a Workchoices effect noticeable? 
Workchoices became the legal industrial relations framework in July 2006 (being an 
amendment to the 1996 Workplace Relations Act. A central justification for the controversial 
deregulation of the wage determination system and the abandonment of unfair dismissal 
protections was that it would increase the rate of job creation (see Mitchell et al. 2005). To 
determine whether Workchoices has promoted a statistically significant change in economic 
outcomes we ran some simple regressions which are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 Job creation and job destruction regressions, 1985(2) to 2007(2) 
 Males Females 
 JCR JCR JDR JDR JCR JCR JDR JDR 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time
Trend 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (2.67) (5.31) (2.17) (3.49) (0.62) (4.05) (1.78) (1.65) 
GDP_GAP 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (1.83) (0.21) (2.11) (1.05) (2.51) (0.02) (2.14) (0.42) 
WORKCHOICES 0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.94) (0.03) (1.15) (0.47) (1.27) (0.70) (0.67) (0.14) 
         
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.26 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.04 0.03 
s.e % mean 18.1 22.7 19.5 27.8 20.8 22.0 21.6 26.7 
Note: s.e. % mean is the standard error of the regression as a percentage of mean of dependent variable and t-
statistics are in parentheses. Constant and lagged dependent terms not reported 
Workchoices is entered as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 after 2006(3) and zero 
prior to that. The regressions also include a lagged dependent variable, a linear time trend and 
a GDP gap variable (constructed as the difference between the actual GDP and a Hodrick-
Prescott filtered series). The GDP gap variable allows us to determine the cyclical sensitivity 
of the job flow measures. While these regressions are simplistic they do produce consistent 
estimates and we argue that if Workchoices has have resulted in a significant shift in 
economic outcomes the dummy variable should be significantly positive in the JCR 
regressions and significantly negative in the JDR regressions. In every case, the Workchoices 
dummy is statistically insignificant. We conclude that the claims made by politicians and 
business representatives about the Workchoices impacts on gross job flows are unable to be 
detected in the data. 
In terms of cyclical sensitivity, the results support those found in Mitchell et al., 2005) that 
full-time flows are cyclically responsive (significant coefficients on GDP_GAP variable), 
while part-time flows are not. The coefficients are as expected but shown as 0.00 although 
they are positive at 4 decimal places. 
4.4 Job flows and the dynamics of unemployment and underemployment 
The regression results reported in Table 2 show that full-time job flows are cyclically 
responsive, whereas part time flows are not. From that perspective and from our reasoning 
above, we hypothesise that full-time flows impact on changes in short-term unemployment. 
Figure 7 shows the relation between these full- and part-time job flows and the short-term 
unemployment rate gap (STUR Gap).  
Figure 7 Flows in full-time job creation and destruction and the STUR gap 
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(a) Male full-time JCR and STUR Gap 
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(b) Female full-time JCR and STUR Gap 
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(c) Male full-time JDR and STUR Gap 
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(d) Female full-time JDR and STUR Gap 
To make the series comparable, all job flow measures are relative to total employment. For 
both males and females, full-time job creation varies negatively with the STUR Gap, whereas 
job destruction varies positively. This is consistent with our intuition that new full-time jobs 
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draw labour predominantly from the short-term unemployment pool. Hence job creation 
should have a negative impact on the STUR Gap and job destruction should have a positive 
impact to the extent that persons losing jobs in the primary labour market (that is, full-time 
jobs) are unable to find jobs elsewhere. Since there are no clear relationships between part-
time flows and short-term unemployment we omit them from further analysis in this paper. 
In Table 3 we report the results from regression of STUR Gap and underemployment on the 
full-time job flows. We also include lagged dependent variables to control for persistence – 
and to account for the fact that unemployment and underemployment are stock variables. We 
use simple OLS as a first exploration in this paper. In terms of columns 2 and 3, male job 
creation and destruction rates have the expected signs on the STUR Gap. This is consistent 
with the interpretation that males with full-time jobs dominate the primary labour market and 
the wage setting process. The impact of part-time jobs is only significant for job creation and 
one should remember that only about 15 per cent of males work part time.  
Consistent with our intuition that females play a less important role in the primary labour 
market we find that as far as part-time jobs are concerned, the impact of female job flows are  
rarely significant. The only exception is that full-time job destruction has a negative effect on 
the STUR Gap, whereas part-time job creation has a weak positive effect. These results can 
be interpreted in the light of the transition of female full-time jobs to female part-time jobs 
that we discussed in section 4.2. The negative impact of destruction of full-time female jobs 
indicates that many women switch from full-time to part-time work, and since more part-time 
jobs are created than full-time jobs are destroyed this would mean that more women find 
work. However, the positive impact of part-time job creation is puzzling. It is obvious that the 
interaction between female job flows requires further research. 
Table 3 The impact of job flows on the short-term unemployment rate gap and 
underemployment, Australia, 1985(1) to 2007(2) 
 STUR Gap UE 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
JCR_M_FT -85.80 3.60 -62.25 2.87 
JDR_M_FT 62.63 2.78 30.75 1.52 
JCR_F_FT -2.48 0.06 19.69 0.65 
JDR_F_FT -83.81 2.34 -45.98 1.34 
JCR_M_PT -104.42 2.56 -17.20 0.46 
JDR_M_PT 64.05 1.34 0.97 0.02 
JCR_F_PT 43.41 1.81 49.77 2.32 
JDR_F_PT 42.55 1.60 -7.05 0.28 
STUR Gap(-1) 0.71 11.40   
UE(-1)   0.92 25.33 
     
Adjusted R2 0.899  0.950  
Constant terms are not reported. M is male, F is female, FT is full-time, and PT is part-time. JCR is the rate of 
job creation and JDR is the rate of job destruction. 
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The impact of job flows on underemployment is shown in the last two columns of Table 3. 
Not surprisingly, male full-time job creation has a significant negative impact. More 
interesting is the positive impact of part-time female job creation: apparently many women 
who enter these jobs would like to work more hours. This is consistent with our notion 
discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.2 of a “Reserve Army” of workers in the secondary labour 
market who can easily be mobilised if the economy picks up. A final observation is the high 
degree of persistence in underemployment. We interpret this as a typical example how hard it 
is to escape from the secondary labour market. The finding that female job creation does not 
have a significant negative impact on underemployment is also consistent with that 
interpretation. It also emphasises the importance of a more careful modelling of the 
interaction between the various job flows. 
5. Conclusion 
The title of our paper challenges the claim that low unemployment will always be 
inflationary. We argue that the traditional Phillips-curve inspired notion that the 
unemployment rate per se disciplines the wage inflation process is no longer valid. Instead, 
we show by estimating an alternative specification of the Phillips curve that the labour market 
restraint works both through short-term unemployment rates and via underemployment. The 
reasoning is that the inflow into short-term unemployment is comprised of mainly primary 
labour market workers who are active in wage bargaining processes, which therefore will 
modify wage restraints in a downturn. Further, as underemployment also increases in a 
downturn, employers can use hours of work as an adjustment in the upturn to meet higher 
demand which places a further constraint on wage bargaining. 
In the second part of our paper we show that by distinguishing between various job flows we 
gain a better understanding of the movements in short-term unemployment and in 
underemployment. We find supporting evidence for our story from descriptive data analysis 
and more formal regression analysis. However, we have exposed issues, such as the 
relationship between gross flows by gender and employment status and the broader measures 
of labour underutilisation that have not been fully explored in the literature and which require 
further analysis. This has in our view a high priority for further research. 
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